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NEW VETERANS LEGISLATION OPENS THE DOOR TO JUDICIAL
REVIEW... SLOWLY!
Why are we as American veterans who defended our government in time of
need ... now forced to petition that government to gain equal access to the
same fundamental rights that we fought to secure for others?'
On November 18, 1988, President Ronald Reagan signed the Veterans'
Judicial Review Act (the Act),2 ending over a century of Congressional
measures to keep veterans' claims for benefits completely out of the court
system.' Prior to this new law, any decision by the Veterans' Adminis-
tration (VA) with respect to a veteran's benefits was final. Many hailed
the recent reversal of past policy, likely the result of a confluence of polit-
ical and judicial developments,4 as a major breakthrough toward equal
treatment of the nation's retired servicemen and women.5
The facts reveal the veterans' plight. The number of veterans has
climbed to more than 28,000,000.6 Ex-servicemen and women file
800,000 disability benefits claims7 each year, of which the VA grants
1. H.R. 585 and Other Bills Relating to Judicial Review of Veterans' Claims: Hearings Before
the House Comm. on Veterans' Affairs, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 233 (1986) [hereinafter I Hearings on
H.R. 585] (statement of Robert 0. Muller, president of Vietnam Veterans of America).
2. Pub. L. No. 100-687, 102 Stat. 4105, Div. A (1988) (to be codified at 38 U.S.C. § 101).
3. Congress initially provided a specific preclusion of judicial review in 1887 for pension cases
arising under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 1491 (1982). Rabin, Preclusion of JudicialReview
in the Processing of Claims for Veterans'Benefits: A Preliminary Analysis, 27 STAN. L. REV. 905, 907
n.14 (1975). In 1933, Congress passed an early version of the modem preclusion statute. See 38
U.S.C. § 705 (1934). This was later slightly reworded and recodified under 38 U.S.C. § 211(a)
(1982).
4. Prior to the 100th Congress, the House Committee on Veterans' Affairs, and more specifi-
cally its chairman, G.V. "Sonny" Montgomery, had stalled all previous attempts at providing judi-
cial review for veterans' claims. See infra note 54. The new push for a VA cabinet post, recently
approved by President Reagan, may have softened the Committee's position. Wash. Post, Oct. 19,
1988, at A21, col. I. Also, a new spirit of compromise seemed to overtake the various veterans'
service organizations. A new congressional report highlighting the errors in the VA claim process
helped focus the Committee's efforts. HouSE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, INVESTIGA-
TION OF DISABILITY COMPENSATION PROGRAMS OF THE VETERANS' ADMINISTRATION, H.R.
REP. No. 886, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. I [hereinafter cited as Investigation of the VA] (1988). Finally, a
recent Supreme Court decision, Traynor v. Turnage, 108 S. Ct. 1372 (1988), eroded the effectiveness
of § 21 l(a)'s preclusion.
5. See, e.g., 134 CONG. REC. S16,658-59 (daily ed. Oct. 18, 1988) (statement of Sen. Murkow-
ski); 134 CONG. REC. S16,638-39 (daily ed. Oct. 18, 1988) (statement of Sen. Cranston). See also
134 CONG. REC. H10,342 (daily ed. Oct. 19, 1988) (statement of Rep. Montgomery, calling the new
legislation a "very good compromise").
6. 1984 VA ANN. REP. 237 (estimated veteran population).
7. This Note will focus primarily on disability claims, because of their frequency of appeal and
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roughly one half. Approximately 66,000 of those veterans initially re-
jected contest the denial, with a fifteen percent success rate.9 About
36,000 of the remainder then appeal to the Board of Veterans' Appeal
(BVA), but almost 27,000 of these remain unsatisfied.' 0 Yet prior to the
Act, these claimants, unlike social security, medicare, and welfare recipi-
ents, I1 had no recourse to the courts for independent judgment on their
appeals.
This Note will address the likely impact of the new legislation on judi-
cial oversight of the VA' 2 : just how much review did the veterans get?
Part One will briefly recount the history of the judiciary's encounters
with the ban on judicial review. Part Two will describe the Act and trace
the development of the new law from its earliest drafts to the final stat-
ute. Part Three will analyze the language of the new law, highlighting
the problematic areas a court might face in interpreting its role. Part
Four will predict the judiciary's response to the Act through application
of new law to recurrent fact patterns brought before the courts.
I. 38 U.S.C. § 211(A) AND THE PRECLUSION OF JUDICIAL REVIEW.
Prior to the passage of the Veterans' Judicial Review Act, the language
of 38 U.S.C. § 211(a) severely limited judicial review of individual VA
benefits decisions, barring review of any decision of the Administrator on
a benefits question. '3 With certain limited exceptions, 14 section 211(a)
the complexity of their treatment. The VA also handles pension claims, as well as a variety of
educational, loan, health and insurance programs.
Approximately 75% of the cases appealed to the Board of Veterans' Appeal (BVA) are disability
cases. SENATE COMM. ON VETERANS' AFFAIRS, VETERANS' ADMINISTRATION ADJUDICATION
PROCEDURE AND JUDICIAL REVIEW ACT, S. Doc. No. 418, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 110 (1988)
[hereinafter Senate Report on S. 11] (statement of Kenneth E. Eaton, chairman of the Board of
Veterans Appeals). This number may become less dramatic compared to pensions claims, given the
lengthening time span since the last large-scale active combat situation. See, e.g., 1984 VA ANN.
REP. 237 (table 51, comparing percentage of veterans receiving disability versus pension, by period
of service).
8. Walters v. National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 309 (1985) (1978 data from
Legal Services Corp. report to Congress).
9. Id.
10. Id. The BVA actually grants about twelve percent of the claims and remands another thir-
teen percent back to the regional offices. Id.
11. 134 CONG. REC. S16,638, S16,643-44 (daily ed., Oct. 18, 1988) (statement of Sen.
Cranston).
12. The Act will affect the operation of the VA in other ways as well. These other provisions
are discussed briefly infra notes 41-51 and accompanying text.
13. 38 U.S.C. § 21 l(a) (1982) reads as follows:
[Tihe decisions of the Administrator on any question of law or fact under any law adminis-
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and its predecessors 5 kept most of the decisions of the VA out of the
courts. Despite the modem presumption of a right to judicial review, 6
Congress until recently seemed content with the VA anachronism. Legis-
lators feared that judicial review for veterans' claims would overburden
the courts, involve them in complex policymaking best left to agency ex-
pertise, and defeat both the uniformity of decisions and the informality of
procedure at the VA. 7 As a result, courts had to apply the statute de-
spite any apparent inequity."t Regardless of whether the question ap-
pealed was one of law or fact,'9 courts denied review with very little
tered by the Veterans' Administration providing benefits for veterans and their dependents
or survivors shall be final and conclusive and no other official or any court of the United
States shall have power or jurisdiction to review any such decision by an action in the
nature of mandamus or otherwise.
14. See infra notes 22-37 and accompanying text.
15. See supra note 3.
16. "We have repeatedly acknowledged 'the strong presumption that Congress intends judicial
review of administrative action.' "Traynor v. Turnage, 108 S. Ct. 1372, 1378 (1988) (quoting Bowen
v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 670 (1986)).
17. Although testimony cited additional reasons for continuing some level of preclusion, these
four reasons were consistently relied upon to defend § 211(a) or to promote a limited scope of re-
view. See, eg., I Hearings on H.R. 585, supra note 1, at 249-55 (statement of Robert O. Muller). See
also Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 370 (1974) (attributing two reasons to Congress for maintain-
ing the bar on judicial review).
18. The VA decisions denied review range from the illogical to the appalling. See, e.g., I Hear-
ings on H.R. 585, supra note I, at 242-44 (statement of Robert 0. Muller) (describing two systems of
veteran benefits, one more advantageous to higher ranking soldiers because of its foundation on base
pay, and the other (the VA) more beneficial financially to lower-paid soldiers; only the former re-
ceives judicial review); Milliken v. Gleason, 332 F.2d 123 (1st Cir. 1964) (in forma pauperis appeal,
alleging, inter alia, "intimidation and physical assault upon [female appellant] by an agent of the
[VA]," barred by § 211(a)).
19. A reviewing court will distinguish between questions of law and questions of fact in agency
actions in general because it affords each differing levels of deference. A court traditionally will
"substitute its judgment" on issues of law, but will apply a more lenient standard in reviewing
agency findings of fact. Levin, Identifying Questions of Law in Administrative Law, 74 GEo. L.J. 1,
9-10 (1985). The distinction may actually be futile because, while its purpose is to define varying
levels of deference accorded, there is authority for the proposition that deference owed to findings of
fact and law are, practically speaking, minimal. See 4 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE,
§ 30.13 (Ist ed. 1958). The delineation waxes in importance for purposes of this Note, however,
because of its use in the Act's scope of review section. See infra notes 120-149 and accompanying
text.
Drawing a line between questions of law and fact has proven to be an elusive task. See, e.g., 5 K.
DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 29.10 (2d ed. 1984); L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF
ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION ch. 14 (1965); Levin, supra; Stem, Review of Findings of Administrators,
Judges, and Juries: a Comparative Analysis, 58 HARV. L. REV. 70, 93-94 (1944). A satisfactory
delineation between issues of law and fact was provided by Robert Stem:
Obviously an issue as to whether a particular act occurred or what a person intended in a
particular situation is factual .... A man's intent may be proved directly by what he said
or circumstantially from what he did .... When the issue relates to the existence or nature
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pause or reflection.
Though many found the statute praiseworthy,2" section 21 l(a) elicited
much criticism as well.21 One early attempt to cut back on the statute's
preclusive effect came not from Congress, but from the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia (D.C. Circuit). Interpreting the language of
an older version of the statute,22 the D.C. Circuit held in a series of cases
that veterans were precluded from challenging only the denial of claims
for benefits; as for already existing benefits, they were free to challenge
the termination thereof.23 Congress closed this loophole in 1970, when it
amended the statute's language.
24
Even after the 1970 amendment, peripheral questions remained as to
whether the scope of section 21 1's preclusion extended to review of con-
stitutional questions and alleged ultra vires actions.2" The Supreme
of a general rule or standard which will be applicable to many cases, it is normally re-
garded as presenting a question of law.
Stern, supra, at 94-95. The difficulty arises in part because questions often will have both factual and
legal elements.
20. The VA Administrator supported § 211(a) in every congressional inquiry but one. Veter-
ans'JudicialReviewAct:Report to AccompanyHR. 5288, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 10-13 (1988) [here-
inafter Report on H.R. 5288]. More important, perhaps, veterans' organizations continued to
support the bar. Id. at 13. See also 2 H.R. 585 and Other Bills Relating to Judicial Review of
Veterans' Claims: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Veterans' Affairs, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 393
(1986) [hereinafter 2 Hearings on H.R. 585] (letter from Charles Joeckel, Jr., Executive Director,
Disabled Veterans of America, opposing judicial review); id. at 395 (letter from R. Powell, Executive
Director, Paralyzed Veterans of America, opposing judicial review). The most influential supporter,
however, was Rep. Montgomery, chairman of the House Veterans' Affairs Committee. Note, for
example, his statement in the 1986 hearings on a veterans' judicial review bill. 1 Hearings on H.R.
585, supra note 1, at 103.
21. One must remember that prior to 1970 and Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), the
courts treated a benefit from the government as a mere "gratuity," and not as a right to which
constitutional concerns of due process attach. Nevertheless, criticism of the preclusion of review
existed. See, e.g., Davis, Veterans' Benefits, Judicial Review and the Constitutional Problems of "Pos-
itive" Government, 39 IND. L.J. 183 (1964).
22. During the period the D.C. Circuit heard these cases, infra note 23, § 211(a) read: "[T]he
decisions of the Administrator ... on any question of law or fact concerning a claim for benefits or
payments under any Act administered by the Veterans' Administration shall be final and conclu-
sive." 38 U.S.C. § 21 l(a) (1964) (emphasis added).
23. Wellman v. Whittier, 259 F.2d 163, 168-69 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (law which precludes review of
VA decisions concerning claim for benefits does not also preclude challenge to forfeiture of those
benefits); Thompson v. Gleason, 317 F.2d 901, 907 (D.C, Cir. 1962) (same); Tracy v. Gleason, 379
F.2d 469, 473-74 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (same).
24. For the text of § 21 l(a) see supra note 13. The House report on H.R. 17958, which effected
this change, specifically mentioned the three D.C. Circuit cases. Service Connected Compensation
Increase for Veterans: Report of the House Committee on Veterans' Affairs, H.R. REP. No. 1166, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. 9-11 (1970).
25. In the context of agency actions, "ultra vires" actions are those that the Administrator
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol67/iss3/14
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Court began its own critical treatment of section 211(a) in 1974, with
Johnson v. Robison.26 Johnson excepted from the law's preclusion consti-
tutional challenges to underlying VA statutes. Addressing the VA's con-
tention that section 211(a) barred the Court from reaching the
constitutionality of veterans' benefits legislation, Justice Brennan wrote,
"[s]uch a construction would, of course, raise serious questions concern-
ing the constitutionality of § 211 (a) .... -"27 The Johnson opinion did not
fully indicate the scope of this constitutional exception,28 leaving the
lower courts in disagreement over two related questions: whether a court
could review the constitutionality of a VA regulation,29 and whether the
VA's individual adjudications could be subject to the same attack.30
takes beyond his authority under applicable statutes, and are thereby analogous to a corporate direc-
tor's ultra vires actions when she oversteps her authority under the corporation's articles and by-
laws. One can differentiate between two types of laws an Administrator can violate: generally appli-
cable statutes and the agency's organic statutes. This distinction becomes important in the Supreme
Court's decision on ultra vires actions, Traynor v. Turnage, 108 S. Ct. 1372 (1988). See infra notes
31-37 and accompanying text.
26, 415 U.S. 361 (1974). Although Justice Brennan did not explain exactly why the prohibition
would therefore be unconstitutional, one might suppose he was referring to the power of the courts
to interpret the law, as set forth in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) ("It is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.").
27. Id. at 366 (footnote omitted).
28. Brennan's opinion carefully distinguished a challenge to the underlying statute from a chal-
lenge to the "decisions of the Administrator." Id. at 367. Yet nowhere did the opinion specifically
address constitutional challenges to individual decisions, in either permissive or prohibitive
language.
29. Because the language of § 21 l(a) specifically refers to decisions of the Administrator, courts
seemed more comfortable in allowing constitutional attacks on Agency-promulgated rules and regu-
lations than on individual claims. Nevertheless, some courts at least intimated that they would
restrict Johnson to its facts, that is, to a constitutional challenge to a statute. Compare Roberts v.
Walters, 792 F.2d 1109 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (reading Johnson as allowing a challenge only to a decision
of Congress, not the Administrator) and Anderson v. Veterans Administration, 559 F.2d 935 (5th
Cir. 1977) (limiting Johnson to challenges of statutory provisions or classifications) with Zayas v.
Veterans Administration, 666 F.Supp. 361 (D.C.Cir. 1980) (§ 211 (a) does not bar a court from hear-
ing constitutional challenges to VA promulgated rules) and Carter v. Cleland, 643 F.2d I (D. P.R.
1987) (same) and Plato v. Roudebush, 397 F.Supp. 1295 (D. Md. 1975) (same).
30. Appellants who have brought constitutional challenges to individual claims decisions have
generally based their claims on allegations of procedural due process deficiencies, although some
have pressed equal protection challenges as well. Prior to the Act, courts disagreed over reviewabil-
ity of individual decision appeals couched in constitutional terms. Compare Pappanikoloaou v. Ad-
ministrator of Veterans Adm'n, 762 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1985) (one may not circumvent § 211(a) by
seeking damages on a constitutional claim arising out of a claim for benefits) and Hartmann v.
United States, 615 F.Supp. 466 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (denying jurisdiction over plaintiff's equal protec-
tion challenge to VA's decision not to provide benefits) and Mulvaney v. Stetson, 470 F. Supp. 725
(N.D. Il1. 1979) (court has no jurisdiction to hear constitutional challenges to actions of the Admin-
istrator) with Walters v. National Ass'n. of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 311 n.3 (dicta) ("de-
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More recently, the Supreme Court, in Traynor v. Turnage,3 1 decided
the ultra vires issue.32 In that suit, veterans alleged that the VA violated
section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act 33 through a regulation denying ben-
efits to primary alcoholics.34 The Supreme Court held that a court could
review a VA regulation for legality under the Rehabilitation Act.35 As a
result, although they lost on the merits, 36 plaintiffs forced the Supreme
Court to admit that it would likely review a VA regulation for consis-
tency with a non-VA statute.3 7
One should not overstate the importance of these exceptions, as they
were just that - two minor gaps in a broad preclusion of review that
kept perhaps 4000 appeals from VA actions out of the courts each year. 8
spite the general preclusion ofjudicial review with respect to VA benefits claims, [the) Court held in
Johnson ... that the district courts have jurisdiction to entertain constitutional attacks on the opera-
tion of the claims systems.") and Marozsan v. United States, 852 F.2d 1469 (7th Cir. 1988) (en bane)
(veteran can challenge the procedures by which claim was processed for constitutional deficiency)
and Devine v. Cleland, 616 F.2d 1080 (9th Cir. 1980) (under Johnson, veteran can challenge the
absence of procedural safeguards in VA regulations).
Plaintiffs' procedural challenges in Marozsan and Devine clearly involved more than just the indi-
vidual decisions of the Administrator in their respective cases. However, one cannot read the cases
as challenges to regulations; the procedures used were either informal (Marozsan) or simply absent
(Devine). In practical terms, these decisions really did allow challenges to the VA's individual deci-
sion. See, e.g., Marozsan, 852 F.2d at 1485 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
31. 108 S. Ct. 1372 (1988).
32. Traynor presented only one type of ultra vires claim: a challenge to the Administrator's
action on the basis of a non-VA statute, that is, one not "administered by the Veterans Administra-
tion." See 38 U.S.C. § 211(a) (1982). Veterans have also attempted, with limited success in the
lower courts, to challenge the Administrator's interpretation of VA-specific statutes. See, e.g., Ever-
green State College v. Cleland, 621 F.2d 1002 (9th Cir. 1980) (veterans challenged VA educational
benefit regulations as contrary to intent of organic statute under which rule was promulgated);
Wayne State Univ. v. Cleland, 590 F.2d 627 (6th Cir. 1978) (same).
33. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1973). This section requires that federal programs not discriminate
against handicapped individuals solely because of their handicaps.
34. "Primary alcoholism," as the VA defines it, is alcoholism unrelated to an underlying psychi-
atric disorder. Traynor, 108 S. Ct. at 1376 n.2. The petitioners claimed that 38 C.F.R. § 3.301(c)(2)
(1987), which labeled primary alcoholism as "willful misconduct" and thus denied benefits to those
afflicted, violated the subsequently enacted section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act as discriminating
against handicapped. See Traynor, 108 S. Ct. at 1376 & n.2.
35. 108 S. Ct. 1372, 1378-80. In answering this narrow question, the Court hinted that it would
review violations of any statute that the VA did not administer, but avoided the broader question of
whether it would review a violation of a VA organic statute. Id.
36. Traynor, 108 S. Ct. 1384.
37. Id. at 1379 ("[T]he cases now before us involve the issue whether the law sought to be
administered is valid in light of a subsequent statement whose enforcement is not the exclusive do-
main of the Veterans' Administration.")
38. Judges Arnold and Breyer, in their statement before the Senate Committee on Veterans'
Affairs, estimated that veterans would appeal 4,550 cases each year from the BVA to the courts if the
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol67/iss3/14
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As Congress heard more stories of the farcical procedures that periodi-
cally occurred at the VA3 9 and received reports that the VA generally was
hiding its problems, 4" the Veterans' Judicial Review Act took shape.
II. THE VETERANS' JUDICIAL REVIEW ACT
A. Overview of the Act
Division A of Public Law 100-687,4t while titled the Veterans' Judicial
Review Act, implements a number of changes related to the fairness of
the VA claims process in general, as well as specifically altering the judi-
cial review scheme of Title 38.42 The new law codifies a set of proce-
dures to be followed at both the local level43 and at the BVA.4
Additionally, the Act creates an extra level of review within the Agency.
Prior to the Act, the BVA was the final level of review for a veteran's
benefit claim.45 The new law establishes the Court of Veterans Appeals
(CVA), an article I court4 6 that will review appeals from the BVA.4 7
The new law will also affect the veteran's representation before the VA.
bar to judicial review was lifted. Judicial Review Legislation: Hearing on S. 11 and S. 2292 Before
the Senate Comm. on Veterans'Affairs, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 582 (1988) [hereinafter Senate Hear-
ings on Judicial Review].
39. One incredible report reached Congress in 1983 through a hearing statement by the Veter-
ans' Due Process, Inc. A former staff legal advisor to the BVA asked her chairman why the Board
had denied a seemingly routine case, in which a black serviceman incurred "pes planus," or flat feet,
while serving in Korea. "He explained that it was because the veteran was black and all black people
eventually get flat feet." Judicial Review of Veterans' Claims: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on Veterans' Affairs, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 255
(1983).
40. See, e.g., Investigation of the VA, supra note 4, at 3-8 (reporting that the VA had been under-
stating the number of errors found in the claims processing programs, and that favoritism, undue
emphasis on production quotas, etc., hampered the BVA from operating in the best interests of
veterans).
41. Pub. L. No. 100-687, 102 Stat. 4105, Div. A (1988). Division B of Public Law 100-687 is
the Veterans' Benefits Improvement Act.
42. Although these elements merit analysis, they are analytically distinguishable from the issue
of judicial review and thus fall outside the focus of this Note. They are mentioned here merely to
convey the context of the Act's judicial review provision.
43. Pub. L. No. 100-687, § 103, 102 Stat. 4105 (1988) (to be codified at 38 U.S.C. §§ 3007-09).
44. Pub. L. No. 100-687 §§ 201-209, 102 Stat. 4105, 4109-12 (1988). Apparently these proce-
dures were in some respects only a codification of what was already going on informally at the VA.
See Senate Report on S. 11, supra note 7, at 27. Some parties to the Act's development thought that
codification of certain adjudications procedures would preserve informality at the VA even after the
imposition of judicial review. Id. at 32.
45. See Rabin, supra note 3, at 913.
46. An article I court, or an administrative court, is an adjudicative body that is part of the
executive branch. In this way, agencies often adjudicate claims within their jurisdiction first, with
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The ten dollar ceiling on attorney fees, unchanged since the Civil War,4 8
effectively eliminated private counsel from the process,4 9 and left veter-
ans only the free representation offered by the various veterans' service
organizations."0 In the Act, Congress lifted this limitation with respect
to work performed after a final BVA decision."
Concerning judicial review, the Act provides for oversight in two
places. First, it allows review of direct challenges to VA regulations.52
Second, it allows review of benefits adjudications.-3 The history of the
judicial review by an article III court generally to follow. See R. CASS AND C. DIVER, ADMINIS-
TRATIVE LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 631-33 (1987).
47. The CVA will enjoy a scope of review of appealable BVA decisions roughly equivalent to
that of a reviewing court over an agency under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C.
§ 706 (1982). The major difference occurs in review of fact findings, which the CVA can set aside if
it finds them to be "clearly erroneous." 38 U.S.C.A. § 4061 (West Supp. 1989). This standard is
arguably broader than either the "substantial evidence" or "arbitrary and capricious" standards
accorded such findings under the APA. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1982).
48. Walters v. National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 359-60 & n.2.
49. Private counsel might have offered to help out a veteran gratuitously, but these gestures
were likely rare.
50. Walters, 473 U.S. at 311.
51. Pub. L. No. 100-687, § 104, 102 Stat. 4105, 4108 (1988). The new law may prove ineffec-
tive. First, the BVA can review and reduce an attorney's fee if it finds it "excessive or unreasonable";
moreover, in no event can the fee exceed twenty percent of the past-due benefits awarded. Id. Sec-
ond, as noted above, the attorney cannot bill for work performed prior to a final decision by the
BVA. This leaves the veteran without paid counsel's assistance during the initial rating board deci-
sion and first appeal. Id.
52. 38 U.S.C.A. § 223(c) (West Supp. 1989) (So one is not confused, Pub. L. 100-322, Title I1,
1203(b)(1), 102 Stat 487, 509 (1988) also added to Title 38 a section 223, entitled "Administrative
settlement of tort claims," which Congress apparently forgot when it passed the Act). This section
essentially opens VA regulations to direct challenges before the courts under APA § 706 scope of
review standards. As will be discussed later, a court can review a challenge to a regulation only
within the context of a benefits adjudication under the new scope of review devised for 38 U.S.C.
§ 4092. See infra note 214 and accompanying text.
53. 38 U.S.C.A. § 4092 (West Supp. 1989). Subsection (d) of § 4092 provides as follows:
(d)(1) The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit shall decide all relevant questions of
law, including interpreting constitutional and statutory provisions. The court shall hold
unlawful and set aside any statute or regulation or any interpretation thereof (other than a
determination as to a factual matter) that was relied upon in the decision of the Court of
Veterans Appeals that the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit finds to be -
(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with
law;
(B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity;
(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or in violation of a
statutory right; or
(D) without observance of procedure required by law.
(2) Except to the extent that an appeal under this chapter presents a constitutional issue,
the Court of Appeals may not review (A) a challenge to a factual determination, or (B) a
challenge to a law or regulation as applied to the facts of a particular case.
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Act illuminates the development of these provisions.
B. History of the Act
L Senate Efforts to Expand Review
Prior to 1988, Congress frequently held hearings concerning section
211 (a)'s strict bar on judicial review.54 On each occasion that the Senate
actually passed measures to amend the law, an unyielding House of Rep-
resentatives thwarted the attempt. 5 Counting on a shift of political
forces, including an initiative to designate a new cabinet post for veter-
ans' affairs,56 Senator Cranston introduced Senate bill S. 11, the Veter-
ans' Judicial Review Act, on the opening day of the One Hundredth
Congress.57 The following spring, Senator Murkowski introduced a sub-
stitute bill, S. 2292.58 These two bills presented the Senate with an ade-
quate medium to debate the issue of scope of review.
Although both Senate bills called for some review of VA regulations,59
they differed on the question of factual review for adjudications.' ° From
54. See, e.g., I Hearings on H.R. 585, supra note 1; Judicial Review of Veterans' Claims: Hear-
ings on H.R. 1959 Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on
Veterans'Affairs, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. (1983); Veterans'Administration Adjudication Procedure and
Judicial Review Act: Hearing on S. 349 and Related Issues Before the Senate Comm. on Veterans'
Affairs, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. (1981); Judicial Review of Veterans' Claims: Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Special Investigations of the House Comm. on Veterans' Affairs, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1980); Veterans' Administration Adjudication Procedure and Judicial Review Act: Hearings on S.
330 Before the Senate Comm. on Veterans'Affairs, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); VA Administrative
Procedure and Judicial Review Act: Hearings on S. 364 and Related Bills Before the Senate Comm.
on Veterans' Affairs, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
55. See S. 636, 98th Cong., Ist Sess., 129 CONG. REC. S8488-97 (daily ed. June 15, 1983); S.
349, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. 1353-65 (1981); S. 330, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG.
REC. 24,751-54 (1979). Each of these bills died in the House. See 134 CONG. REC. S16658 (daily ed.
Oct. 18, 1988) (statement of Sen. Murkowski).
56. See supra note 4.
57. 133 CONG. REC. S148 (daily ed. Jan. 7, 1987) (continuation of Senate proceedings of Jan. 6,
1987).
58. 134 CONG. REC. S4188 (daily ed. Apr. 18, 1988).
59. Both bills allowed the Administrator to promulgate rules under the Administrative Proce-
dures Act's provisions, and to varying degrees, each allowed judicial review of those regulations. See
S. 11, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1987) (allowing review of regulations within a challenge to an
adjudication), reprinted in Senate Hearings on Judicial Review, supra note 38, at 67; S. 2292, 100th
Cong., 2d Sess. 2, 7-8 (1988) (allowing direct review of regulations), reprinted in Judicial Review of
Veterans'Affairs: Hearing Before the House Comm. on Veterans' Affairs, 100th Cong, 2d Sess. 133,
138 (1988) [hereinafter House Hearings on Judicial Review].
60. S. 2292 actually limited judicial review to determining the validity of agency regulations
only. S. 2292, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1988), reprinted in House Hearings on Judicial Review, supra
note 59, at 138. Under this version, a court could review neither the interpretation of a regulation or
1989]
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previous attempts to rewrite section 211(a), the Senate had learned that
full factual review under traditional standards61 would arouse fear in the
House of Representatives of both overburdening the court system and
disrupting the nonadversarial nature of the VA claims system. 2 There-
fore, constraining factual review within the new scheme became a prior-
ity, the question remaining being just how far.
S. I l's scope of review section followed almost exactly the format of
the Administrative Procedures Act (APA),63 except that, instead of re-
viewing factual findings for "substantial evidence," 64  a court would be
able to set aside a finding only "when it [was] so utterly lacking in a
rational basis in the evidence that a manifest and grievous injustice would
result if such finding were not set aside."' 6  Acknowledging that under
this new standard a court would overturn only a very small number of
fact findings, 66 Senator Cranston still considered some level of factual
review necessary to address the problems existing under section 211 (a).6 7
Conversely, S. 2292 called for the BVA to address separately in any
statute within a case nor the fact findings of a case. S. 11, on the other hand, allowed not only for
review of regulations and questions of law from adjudications, but even provided for limited review
of fact findings as well. S. 11, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1987), reprinted in Senate Hearings on
Judicial Review, supra note 38, at 88. Because the question of fact review dominated the Senate
committee's report on the two bills, it is clear that this difference, and not review of nonfact issues,
was of central importance to the Committee. See, e.g., Senate Hearings on Judicial Review, supra
note 38, at 175 (statement of Sen. John Kerry, Comm. on Veterans' Affairs, denouncing S. 2292 for
its failure to allow fact review); id. at 124 (statement of Sen. Matsumaya, same).
61. The term "traditional standards" refers to those standards which courts apply under the
APA when reviewing fact findings in adjudications: findings found to be "arbitrary and capricious,"
APA § 706(2)(A) 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2)(A), (1982), or "unsupported by substantial evidence." APA
§ 706(2)(E), 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (1982).
62. For one manifestation of these fears, see House Hearings on Judicial Review, supra note 59,
at 259 (statement of Paul R. Verkuil). For criticism of such concerns, see 1 Hearings on H.R. 585,
supra note 1, at 249-54 (statement of Robert 0. Muller).
63. Compare the language of S. I I's scope of review provision, S. 11, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 21-
22 (1987), reprinted in Senate Hearings on Judicial Review, supra note 38, at 87-88, with the APA's
scope of review, 38 U.S.C. § 706 (1982). The only variations, aside from organizational changes, are
the deletion of the trial de novo section, § 706(2)(f), the specification of review on the whole record,
and the change of § 706(2)(e)'s "substantial evidence" standard.
64. 38 U.SC. § 706(2)(e) (1982) applies the "substantial evidence" test to formal rulemaking
and adjudications.
65. S. 11, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1987), reprinted in Senate Hearings on Judicial Review,
supra note 38, at 88.
66. See Senate Report on S. 11, supra note 7, at 130-31 (additional views of Sen. Cranston).
Note also Sen. Murkowski's recounting of Judge Arnold's view that "almost any factual finding
could survive [S. I I's] test." Id. at 114.
67. See Senate Report on S. 11, supra note 7, at 130-31 (additional views of Sen, Cranston).
This Note discusses the problems Senator Cranston may have feared in Part IV.
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appeal the validity of the VA regulation questioned therein.68 A court of
appeals could then hear a challenge only as to this determination.6 9 Sen-
ator Murkowski believed that the power to review the validity of a VA
regulation would make the BVA a more independent body and therefore
a more dependable forum of review overall.70 S. 2292, however, did not
allow for judicial review of either the VA's findings of law or findings of
fact.71
Hence, the critical question of whether or not to grant judicial review
of the VA's factual determinations in adjudications was before the Senate.
Senator Murkowski denounced factual review, emphasizing a number of
concerns including the added strain on the judicial system, 72 the mislead-
ing sense of hope S. 11 would give veterans,73 and the need for compro-
mise to get the measure through the House.7 4 Senator Cranston
responded to this challenge by citing a veteran's right to equal access to
the court system,75 the need for factual review to answer some of the
problems judicial review is intended to solve,76 and the favorable impact
factual review would have on BVA adjudication outcomes and clarity. 7 7
By close votes in both the Committee on Veterans' Affairs and on the
floor, the Senate opted for S. 1 l's scope of review, including review of
68. S. 2292, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1988), reprinted in House Hearings on Judicial Review,
supra note 59, at 138.
69. Id.
70. Senate Report on S. 11, supra note 7, at 112, 114-15 (additional views of Senators Murkow-
ski, Thurmond, and Stafford). Even the new law left unchanged 38 U.S.C. § 4004(c), which pre-
cludes the BVA from questioning VA regulations in the context of an appeal. See 38 U.S.C.A.
§ 4004 (West Supp. 1989). However, the new CVA will have jurisdiction over such questions. See
supra note 47.
71. See supra note 60.
72. Senate Report on S. 11, supra note 7, at 115 (additional views of Sen. Murkowski).
73. Murkowski dramatized this point on the floor of the Senate: "Where is the justice there,
Mr. President? We create the illusion that there is a review, but there really is not. All that is left
are the attorneys' fees to be paid, and paid by whom? Paid by the veteran." 134 CONG. REC. S9192
(daily ed. July 11, 1988).
74. "I see S. 2292 as a compromise which has the potential of enactment .... We have to look
at why our bills died in the House on four occasions." 134 CONG. REC. S9191 (daily ed. July 11,
1988).
75. Senate Report on S. 11, supra note 7, at 60.
76. Note Cranston's discussion of scope of review on the floor of the Senate. 134 CONG. REC.
59185 (daily ed. July 11, 1988).
77. "I am satisfied that providing for factual review even of a narrow scope will have a very
salutary effect on the operations of the BVA - on the evenhandedness of its decisions and on the
thoroughness and clarity of its opinions." Senate Report on S. 11, supra note 7, at 130 (additional
views of Sen. Cranston).
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fact findings.78
2. The House Compromise
The House Committee on Veterans' Affairs and its chairman, G.V.
"Sonny" Montgomery, were not impressed with the arguments for fac-
tual review.79 Notwithstanding the various bills favoring some standard
of factual review which were presented in the House,80 the Committee
chose to write its own bill' t-one which formulated a new compromise
scope of review.
The product of the House committee's efforts, H.R. 5288, followed a
consensus among the bills presented82 by allowing full judicial review of
VA regulations. The bill essentially borrowed the APA's procedures for
both rulemaking83 and judicial review of rules so promulgated. 4 The
House committee changed the forum for judicial review, however; in-
stead of allowing appeals to be heard in federal district courts or courts
of appeal,85 H.R. 5288 gave exclusive jurisdiction to the Court of Ap-
peals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC).86
The House committee struck a compromise on scope of review for ad-
judications which divided potentially appealable issues into three catego-
78. The Coriimittee voted to report S. 11, as amended, over S. 2292 by only a 7-4 vote, Senate
Report on S. 11, supra note 7, at 111. The Senate tabled the motion to amend S. 11 with the substi-
tute, S. 2292, by only a 61-36 margin, despite the Committee's recommendation. 134 CONG. REC.
S9205 (daily ed. July 11, 1988). The amended version of S. 11 included a provision allowing review
of VA regulations, undoubtedly added in response to S. 2292. S. 11, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 26,
reprinted in House Hearings on Judicial Review, supra note 59, at 169.
79. Rep. Montgomery, opening the House committee hearings, stated, "I am not persuaded,
however, that factual decisions on veterans' claims should be subject to judicial review in the Federal
courts .... " House Hearings on Judicial Review, supra note 59, at 2.
80. Besides S. 11, the House committee also considered H.R. 639, which called for review of
fact findings under an "arbitrary and capricious" standard. H.R. 639, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 16-
17 (1987), reprinted in House Hearings on Judicial Review, supra note 59, at 83, 98-99.
81. H.R. 5288 was introduced to the House on September 14, 1988, six days after the House
hearings. The Committee ordered the bill reported out on September 15. See Report on H.R. 5288,
supra note 20, at 4.
82. See supra notes 59, 78. See also, H.R. 5039, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 10-11, (1988), re-
printed in House Hearings on Judicial Review, supra note 59, at 116-17; H.R. 639, 100th Cong., 1st
Sess. 1, 16-17 (1988), reprinted in House Hearings on Judicial Review, supra note 59, at 98-99.
83. See H.R. 5288, Report on H.R. 5288, supra note 20, at 54.
84. Id.
85. H.R. 639 provided for judicial review by any federal district court. House Hearings on
Judicial Review, supra note 59, at 96. H.R. 5039, S. 2292 and S. 11 all would have allowed review in
the federal courts of appeals. Id. at 125, 138, 169-79.
86. Report on H.R. 5288, supra note 20, at 69.
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ries: questions of law, questions of fact, and questions of "application." 7
Because the language of the Act as passed arguably adopts the same pre-
emption scheme, 8 a brief consideration of what the House probably
meant by this breakdown will be useful.
Courts have generally used differing levels of deference when review-
ing an agency's findings of law and findings of fact, substituting their own
judgment relatively freely89 in the case of the former but reviewing the
latter only for some level of rationality.90 However, commentators have
noted that courts often apply the more lenient rationality test to agency
findings which in effect impose normative standards, that is, they appear
to be findings of law.9' Such determinations constitute a third category
of issues on appeal, termed questions of application, 92 analogous to a
finding of law yet receiving the treatment of findings of fact. The House
was evidently describing this third category through the use of the phrase
"application of any law." 93
There has been much debate over why courts choose a more or less
87. H.R. 5288's preclusion section, after specifically allowing appeal on questions of law, states:
"The Court of Appeals may not review the facts of the appeal or the application of any law or
regulation to those facts unless there is presented a constitutional issue." Report on H.R. 5288, supra
note 20, at 69-70. Note how this formulation compares with the "traditional" breakdown of only
questions of law and questions of fact. Supra note 19.
88. This Note posits that the language of the Act as adopted may create a different effect than
the language of H.R. 5288. See infra notes 121-51 and accompanying text.
89. "Substituting their judgment" is the phrase traditionally associated with the low level of
deference the courts show toward agency findings of law. See 5 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE § 29:9 (2d ed. 1984). However, because of developments in recent years, this phrase re-
quires qualification. The principles laid out in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984)
and other cases dictate that, as a prudential matter, a court should pay some deference to the
agency's interpretation.
90. See supra note 19.
91. Compare, for example, NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 130-31 (1944),
which applies a lenient test, with Packard Motor Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485, 490 (1947) which
seems to substitute the Court's judgment on the same question of defining "employee." Several
commentators have picked up on the striking difference in treatment of these two cases. See, eg., L.
JAFFE, supra note 19, at 558-64; Levin, supra note 19, at 24-25. Another example of lenient review
in a normative context occurs in Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 568 (1980)
(court is bound by agency interpretation so long as it "is not irrational"). The last section of this
Note will develop more fully how a court is likely to handle mixed questions as they arise in the VA
context.
92. See Levin, supra note 19.
93. Rep. Montgomery describes the language as referring to "mixed questions." 134 CONG.
REc. H10343 (daly ed., Oct. 19, 1988). "Mixed questions" is another name for law application. L.
JAFFE, supra note 19, at 563; Levin, supra note 19, at 6.
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lenient test in cases which all seem to involve enforcing legal standards. 4
The House appears to have adopted the view that a court finds a question
of application where the court believes the underlying law or regulation
gives the agency discretion in fixing a standard.95 Whereas Congress
often clearly imposes rules for the agency to enforce, sometimes the legis-
94. Aside from the theory described in the following text, this Note will only mention several
major commentators and the relative likelihood of their theories serving as the House's model in
adopting § 4092. A more comprehensive listing of the literature can be found in Levin, supra note
19.
Henry Hart began with the proposition that questions of law must be open to judicial considera-
tion. Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialec-
tic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1377 (1953). Hart found decisions such as Hearst, 322 U.S. I11,
consistent with his proposition, because these presented not questions of law, but rather a "'body of
rules and principles that grow out of the exercise of administrative discretion' - at least while the
rules are in process of crystallizing." Also, he anticipated that courts would be able to decide the
breadth of agency discretion and control it. Hart, supra at 1377-78. Hart's second argument does
not go very far in relating a standard that Congress might enforce. His first argument, that courts
will defer to agencies when they see the agency using discretion, is actually quite close in language to
the theory discussed in the text of this Note. However, Professor Hart did not explain his "discre-
tion" theory very thoroughly.
Louis Jaffe's theory confronts this issue differently; he adopts the understanding that both catego-
ries of questions are still questions of law. L. JAFFE, supra note 19, at 553-55. Because Congress
specifically differentiated questions of law from questions of application, it is unlikely it intended to
adopt Professor Jaffe's view.
Finally, Professor Davis proposed that the confusion surrounding the two levels of review could
not be defined by differentiating "law" from related concepts, due to the lack of a meaningful distinc-
tion between the two. K. DAVIS, supra note 19, at § 29:9. This theory, like Jaffe's, does not help
determine what the House intended, because the House attempted just what Davis proposed was
impossible.
95. The House Report's section-by-section analysis of the bill describes the fact and application
preclusion, and follows it with an explanatory reference to the ABA restatement of the scope of
review doctrine. Report on H.R. 5288, supra note 20, at 36. The position of this restatement is that
questions of law arise only where there is some standard, either statutory or constitutional, that the
agency must follow. Levin, Scope-of-Review Doctrine: Restatement and Commentary, 38 ADMIN. L.
REV. 233, 235, 267-8. This division leaves out from questions of law instances where, although the
agency is defining principles to be followed, it does so with Congress' intent that the agency exercise
its discretion. The restatement, therefore, follows the "discretionary" model described by several
recent commentators. See Levin, supra note 19; Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State,
83 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1983). See also Wald, Some Thoughts on Beginnings and Ends: Court of
Appeals Review of Administrative Law Judges' Findings and Opinions, 67 WASH. U.L.Q. 661, 666
(1989) (Chief Judge of the D.C. Circuit, stating that "[agency] interpretation of statutory law, if
reasonable, will prevail when we do not think Congress has spoken to the precise issue.").
Although the above reference in the legislative history is not dispositive, there is so little legislative
history on the interpretation of "application of law" that such reference takes on great weight. The
dearth of history is the result of the Committee's drafting of H.R. 5288, which went unreported.
Additionally, the provision was injected into the final bill in secret committee meetings, again unre-
ported. Thus, one is left only with the above reference and several informal remarks made on the
floor of either house.
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lation leaves the decision to the agency as to what rule to impose.96
Under the theory that the House adopted, a court will review normative
findings for mere rationality when it concludes that Congress has left the
issue open for agency discretion; the agency's "application" of a broad
statute garners greater deference than its interpretation of a rule imposed
by Congress.
97
Returning to the House compromise, H.R. 5288 barred a court from
reviewing any findings of fact or any application of law to fact in the
meaning discussed above.98 This scheme left a court only the authority
to review adjudications on questions of law.
The addition of a new administrative level of appeal may have placated
those Congressmen who believed H.R. 5288's scope of review was too
narrow.99 The CVA was to consist of a panel of judges" appointed by
96. In some situations, this difference could be blatant in the statute: Congress may enact a
standard, or explicitly defer to the agency. In others, the distinction may come from the legislative
history.
97. Where Congress has left the decision of a standard up to the agency, it is possible to refer to
the agency's ultimate decision as "applying" the statute to the given situations that arise. This use of
"application" makes the statements on the floor of either House at the time of passage consistent
with the "discretionary" theory proposed here. See, e.g., 134 CONG. REC. H10,343 (daily ed. Oct.
19, 1988) (statement of Rep. Montgomery, explaining that the CAFC must deny relief where a
veteran "alleges that the regulation as applied to the particular facts in his or her case produced a
result that should be overturned"); 134 CONG. REC. S16,659 (daily. ed. Oct. 18, 1988) (statement of
Sen. Cranston, explaining that "[t]he federal circuit cannot review whether, in a particular case, a
law or regulation was applied inappropriately").
In fairness, two other explanations for these illustrative comments exist. First, it is possible Con-
gress really did envision a difference, even where the organic statute dictated a standard, between the
standard itself and the agency's "application" of that standard (and, implicitly, between that applica-
tion and the agency's understanding of the facts). Implying such a "third step" in the process of
agency adjudication makes little sense. Once an agency has determined the standard to be applied,
and interpreted the facts presented by the case before it, there seems little room for complaint as to
how it fits those two pieces together.
The second possible explanation, one which might obtain even were a court to believe the first, is
that many or all of those in Congress involved in the debate simply did not understand the exact
contours of the distinction they were announcing. Differentiating between questions of fact and law
has given Congress trouble before, in the context of the Bumper's Amendment. See Levin, supra
note 19, at 5-9.
98. Part Four of this Note assumes that the above discussion describes the intent behind the
Act as well, and discusses the effect such preclusion will have on recurrent situations brought before
the VA.
99. H.R. 5288's plan for the CVA, a new article I court, eventually became law. See supra notes
45-47 and accompanying text.
100. Under H.R. 5288, the CVA was to consist of up to sixty-five judges. Report on H.R. 5288,
supra note 20, at 62. The final version reduced the number to no more than seven judges. 38
U.S.C.A. § 4053(a) (West Supp. 1989).
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the President and empowered to review BVA decisions. Many thought
that this independent review board would compensate for any deficien-
cies inherent in the limited scope of judicial review.' 0 '
S. 11, as amended by the substitute H.R. 5288, passed in the House,10 2
and was reintroduced to the Senate at the beginning of the final week of
the One Hundredth Congress.10 3 Pressed for time,'" 4 the heads of both
House and Senate committees bypassed conference, and apparently held
private meetings to hammer out a further compromise. 0 5  The Senate
passed the resulting bill on October 18,106 and the House approved the
compromise amendment the next day.1
0 7
III. 38 U.S.C. § 4092: AN ANALYSIS
The new statute provides separately for judicial review of VA regula-
tions 08 and for judicial review of individual decisions of the new CVA.109
Although the change in the scope of review for regulations was much
more sweeping when compared to the old law,1 0 by far the greater con-
troversy surrounded the new scope of review for individual benefits
claims."' Several portions of the Act are noteworthy, because of either
101. See 134 CONG. REC. S16,658 (daily ed. Oct. 18, 1988) (statement of Sen. Murkowski).
Under the law as passed, the CVA will have reversal power equivalent to an appeals court, that is,
where the findings below were "clearly erroneous." 38 U.S.C.A. § 4061(a)(4) (West Supp. 1989).
The scope of this Note does not include an analysis and prediction of the CVA's effectiveness at
rooting out VA claims errors. It should be stressed, therefore, that the discussion in Part Four
predicts only the effectiveness of independent judicial review, and not of the new law overall.
102. 134 CONG. REc. H9370, H9375 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1988).
103. 134 CONG. REC. S16,632 (daily ed. Oct. 18, 1988).
104. At the end of that week, the legislature would adjourn, the One Hundredth Congress would
close, and all legislation not passed at that time would die. To avoid this fate, and the prospect of
having to build momentum and a coalition again, the bill's sponsors pushed hard for passage.
105. Cranston cryptically announced the bill as a "substitute amendment ... in lieu of a confer-
ence report." 134 CONG. REC. S16,638 (daily ed. Oct. 18, 1988). One newspaper called the final bill
the product of "secret negotiations." N.Y. Times, October 19, 1988, at A14, col. 5.
106. 134 CONG. REC. S16,660 (daily ed. Oct. 18, 1988) (statement of Sen. Cranston).
107. 134 CONG. REC. HI0,333-61 (daily ed., Oct. 19, 1988).
108. 38 U.S.C.A. § 223 (West Supp. 1989).
109. 38 U.S.C.A. § 4092 (West Supp. 1989).
110. The language of 38 U.S.C. § 21 l(a) (1982) (old law) seemed to preclude all review of agency
regulations; the new law provides full Administrative Procedure Act (APA) style review for both
legal and factual components of VA regulations, as found in 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1982). See supra note
52. This change is not as sweeping as one might think, in light of some judicial interpretations of the
scope of § 211(a). See, e.g., Traynor v. Turnage, 108 S. Ct. 1372 (1988) (§ 211(a) does not bar
review of a VA regulation on an ultra vires challenge); Carter v. Cleland, 643 F.2d 1 (D.C.Cir. 1980)
(§ 211(a) does not bar a court from hearing constitutional challenges to VA promulgated rules).
I 11. VA regulations review aroused little complaint, supra note 82 and accompanying text,
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their effect or the very uncertainty of their effect. This Part addresses
the controversial portions: first, it questions Congress' ultimate choice of
the forum in which judicial review will take place; second, it gives careful
analysis to the literal meaning of the Act's division of reviewable and
nonreviewable issues; third, it illustrates the effect of Congress' decision
to allow full judicial review of any constitutional issue; and fourth, it
demonstrates the import of the Act's preclusion of VA rating schedule
review.
A. Review by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
Although one cannot doubt Congress' desire to open the courts to vet-
erans, one might question its choice of forums for judicial review. Pro-
posals forwarded in each house provided schemes that would have
allowed review either by any federal district court or by any federal court
of appeals. 1 2 Each plan would have assigned an appeal to a court which
stood reasonably close geographically to the appealing veteran's home.
Nevertheless, the Act drew from H.R. 5288113 the limitation that the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC), located in Washing-
ton, D.C., would enjoy exclusive jurisdiction.' 14 While Congress stressed
the advantage such limited jurisdiction would have for the uniformity of
nationwide VA policy," 5 this choice will likely impede some eligible vet-
erans in seeking judicial review.' 16 Balanced against this hardship is the
notion of uniform policy, a benefit that no comparable agency enjoys117
and one that is of questionable utility.118
whereas much of the debate in Congress centered on fact finding review. See supra notes 60-88 and
accompanying text.
112. See supra note 85.
113. Report on H.R. 5288, supra note 20, at 69.
114. 38 U.S.C.A. § 4092 (West Supp. 1989).
115. 134 CONG. REC. S16,649-50 (daily ed. Oct. 18, 1988) (statement of Sen. Cranston); Report
on H.R. 5288, supra note 20, at 28.
116. Senator Cranston admits to this failing of the new legislation, but cites the need to compro-
mise as a reason for the limitation. Id. His alternative explanation, that the veteran need not appear
at the argument before the CAFC, makes little sense, considering the expense of sending an attorney
to Washington. A Veterans Organization service representative would be available in Washington,
D.C., but this answer ignores the veterans' major victory of the removal of the attorney fees cap. See
Pub. L. No. 100-687, § 104, 102 Stat. 4105 (1988) (amending 38 U.S.C. § 3404). See also supra notes
48-51 and accompanying text.
117. The only agency comparable in size to the VA and distributing benefits across the country is
the Social Security Administration. It does not enjoy the convenience of exclusive CAFC
jurisdiction.
118. Because the VA distributes benefits through its regional offices, these offices would follow
19891
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Moreover, while opponents of full judicial review often cited the mas-
sive burden it would impose on the federal courts, 119 there is no appraisal
in the legislative history of how the final legislation would affect the
CAFC's docket.120 In protecting the efficiency of the country's judicial
system as a whole, Congress may have clogged the very court in which
veterans themselves may seek review.
B. Review of Issues of Law
Naturally much of the debate in the committee hearings centered on
which issues the Act should allow the judiciary to scrutinize.1 21 Review
of agency adjudications is generally divided between review of issues of
law, issues of fact, and issues of application of law to fact., 22 In choosing
to report out S. 11 rather than S. 2292, the Senate committee explicitly
opted for a level of factual review as well as review of legal issues.' 23 The
House version, on the other hand, allowed review of questions of law, but
barred review of either "facts... or the application of any law or regula-
tion to those facts ....
In the broad effort to compromise, Congress adopted scope of review
language which paralleled the House bill, but with a shift in word order.
This shift may present a problem of interpretation for a reviewing court.
Instead of barring review of a challenge to the application of law to fact,
the Act precludes review of "a challenge to a law or regulation as applied
to the facts."'125 Because the language speaks of a challenge to a law
rather than to the application of a law, the provision appears to sidestep
the administrative review concept of law application.
26
the rules laid down by their particular jurisdiction. On appeal, the BVA, like any other agency,
could simply follow the law of the circuit from which the appeal came.
119. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
120. The number of cases filed in the CAFC in the administrative year 1987-88 was slightly less
than 1300. Detailed Statistical Tables, ANN. REP. OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMIN. OF COURTS 1
(1988). The addition of veterans' appeals, estimated conservatively at more than 4000, to that
court's docket may quadruple the number of cases of which the court will have to dispose. See supra
note 38.
121. See supra 59-98 and accompanying text.
122. See supra note 53 (language of § 4092(d)(2)).
123. Supra notes 72-78 and accompanying text.
124. See supra note 87.
125. 38 U.S.C.A. § 4092 (d)(2)(B) (West Supp. 1989) (emphasis added). Subsection (d)(2) reads:
"Except to the extent that an appeal under this chapter presents a constitutional issue, the Court of
Appeals may not review (A) a challenge to a factual determination, or (B) a challenge to a law or
regulation as applied to the facts of a particular case." Id.
126. Reading the provision to cover applications of law to fact in the administrative review sense
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On examination, the literal meaning of the section more closely de-
scribes an as-applied challenge, the type evidenced in the Supreme
Court's decision of Bowers v. Hardwick.'2 7 In such an attack, a party
makes no attempt to invalidate the statute or regulation in every applica-
tion,'12 conceding that in some instances it might very well be legitimate.
The party instead charges that when the statute or regulation is applied
to him, it violates some outside authority129 ; in that particular applica-
tion, the law is invalid. The Bowers Court dealt only with the question
raised by the particular facts: whether the Georgia sodomy statute was
unconstitutional as applied to members of the same sex. 130 The Court
refused to answer respondents' challenge that the statute would be un-
constitutional when applied to any couple, even one of opposite gen-
der.' 3 1 Central to this or any other as-applied analysis is the limited
remedy available. Had respondents won in Bowers,132 the statute would
not be completely invalid, but merely inapplicable to same-sex
couples. 1
33
Usually, as-applied challenges arise under an asserted constitutional
privilege. For example, the procedural due process clause,13 4 substantive
is not implausible. However, the language is at best confusing, and one not well versed in the provi-
sion's history might easily come up with a different understanding.
127. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). Bowers dealt with a substantive due process challenge to a Georgia
sodomy law under which a couple of the same sex was arrested. Id. at 187-88.
The argument that the language of § 4092 invokes this as-applied understanding gains strength
from misstatements or misunderstandings of members of Congress themselves. Note, for example,
one attempt by Rep. Montgomery to explain the application provision: "The Courts cannot hold
that a regulation is valid generally but is invalid as applied to the facts of a given case." 134 CONG.
REC. H 10,343 (daily ed. Oct. 19, 1988). The description defines an as-applied attack in the Bowers v.
Hardwick sense.
128. This would be a facial challenge to the statute. As an example, a facial challenge might be
brought on the facts of Plessy v. Fergusson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), in which a statute barred blacks
from riding in the same train car as whites. This law is invalid on its face by modem fourteenth
amendment standards, as it could never be applied in a way consistent with the Constitution.
129. The authority violated might be constitutional or statutory, as the discussion brings out.
130. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190.
131. Brief for Respondent at 5, Bowers, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (No. 85-140).
132. Respondents lost in Bowers, the Court ruling that the due process clause does not protect
the right to engage in homosexual sodomy. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196.
133. This result is intended for illustration only. In reality, the Court's purpose in paring the
issue down to an as-applied challenge was to avoid answering whether the statute was constitutional
when applied to mixed gender couples, married or not. Therefore, there was never a possibility that
it may have struck down the law with respect to same sex couples only.
134. An as-applied challenge under the procedural due process clause is relatively easy to imag-
ine. In the context of a benefits administration like the VA, due process may not always require a
hearing before a denial of benefits. Suppose a VA regulation denies any formal hearing on a disabil-
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due process clause,135 and even the equal protection clause1 36 provide the
type of rights on which a statute or regulation might only occasionally
infringe, making each susceptible to use in this form of attack. There-
fore, one arguing against the above reading of section 4092(d)(2) could
complain that it conflicts with the directly preceding constitutional ex-
ception. 137 Were as-applied challenges limited to constitutional viola-
tions, a reader could conclude that, because the Act explicitly allows
review of any challenge of constitutional magnitude, Congress would not
have immediately thereafter prohibited a class of challenges which could
only be constitutional. However, as-applied challenges might arise in a
statutory context as well, thus rebutting the alleged inconsistency. 13 8
An example of a statutory as-applied challenge might be helpful. The
petitioners in Traynor v. Turnage 139 challenged a regulation that specifi-
cally deemed primary alcoholism 4" "willful misconduct," a status under
which a veteran forfeits certain benefits.' 4 ' Had the Rehabilitation Act
demarcated only a certain subset of primary alcoholics, and forbidden
any denial of federal benefits based solely on this more specific handi-
ity benefits determination. A veteran with a broken arm could likely get an equally accurate deter-
mination with only a submission of doctors' reports. However, a veteran claiming Agent Orange-
related illness might argue that his situation is so complex that due process requires a hearing based
on the risk of erroneous deprivation. This veteran would not challenge the regulation on its face, but
only as it applies to his situation.
135. Bowers was a substantive due process case. See supra notes 126-32 and accompanying text.
136. As-applied challenges based on the equal protection clause are more rare than due process
challenges. In the usual context of race or gender, the classification involved is unlikely to violate
the fourteenth amendment with regard to some members of the class but not others. Such a chal-
lenge did arise in the context of the mentally handicapped, in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985). There, petitioners argued that the operation of the zoning ordinance to
deny a building permit to them specifically, and in that particular spot, was an equal protection
violation. They were willing to concede that such a claim on a denial of a permit might not be
available to other mentally handicapped persons or to them if they were in a different location. Id.
137. The exception allows any challenge based on the Constitution. 38 U.S.C.A. § 4092(d)(2)
(West Supp. 1989).
138. With the existence of statutory as-applied challenges, § 4092(d)(2) is consistent. The provi-
sion might be read to allow review of all constitutional challenges, but to deny review of as-applied
challenges that are not constitutional in nature.
Although this Note calls the challenges "statutory as-applied," the same principles apply to an as-
applied challenge to a regulation.
139. 108 S. Ct. 1372 (1988).
140. See supra note 34.
141. 38 U.S.C. § 1662(a)(1) (1982) allows a time extension on VA educational benefits for veter-
ans who were prevented from using them earlier due to "a physical or mental disability which was
not the result of... [their] own misconduct."
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cap, 142 veterans falling within that subset could raise an as-applied chal-
lenge to the VA regulation. 43 While not invalid on its face, the
regulation might violate the hypothetical Rehabilitation Act as applied to
these veterans.44
In the context of the Act, the VA might proffer this literal reading to
prevent a veteran from getting review for a statutory as-applied chal-
lenge.' 4 -1 Conversely, the veteran who desires access to the courts on a
question involving the application of law to facts would also find this
analysis useful 46 : if section 4092(d)(2)(B) addresses only as-applied
challenges, nothing in the subsection explicitly precludes challenges to
law application in the administrative law sense.147
Pragmatically, a veteran is unlikely to be able to convince a court that
Congress was only concerned with statutory as-applied challenges when
it enacted section 4092(d)(2)(B). The legislative history spells out too
clearly the emphasis on barring both review of facts and review of
"mixed questions,"'' 48 which relates to the administrative law concept of
law application. 149 Nevertheless, the wording of the provision might per-
142. The argument in Traynor was, in reality, only that the Rehabilitation Act mandates that all
alcoholics be treated on a case-by-case basis, without a per se rule as to their right to benefits.
Traynor 108 S. Ct. at 1384. The above hypothetical serves to illustrate a statutory as-applied
challenge.
143. For simplicity, suppose there is a divorce section of the Rehabilitation Act, which singles
out persons whose alcoholism was brought on by divorce. These individuals then cannot be denied a
federal benefit based on their alcoholism. The VA regulation would, in denying benefits to the gen-
eral set of primary alcoholics, also deny benefits to this subset of divorced primary alcoholics. The
latter denial violates the hypothetical Rehabilitation Act's proscription.
144. The remedy for a statutory as-applied challenge to an administrative regulation might vary
from the norm of constitutional challenges to statutes. Instead of letting the regulation remain on
the books with its narrower scope of application, the reviewing court might simply strike the whole
regulation and give the agency a chance to repromulgate.
145. As described above, only nonconstitutional challenges can be precluded in this manner,
because of the constitutional exception in § 4092(d)(2). See supra note 137. See also infra notes 152-
60 and accompanying text.
146. For examples of challenges that involve questions of law application, see infra notes 169-
216 and accompanying text.
147. See supra notes 89-97 and accompanying text (defining administrative law concept of law
application).
148. See, e.g., 134 CONG. REc. H 10,343 (daily ed., Oct. 19, 1988) (Statement of Rep. Montgom-
ery). A "mixed question" is another way to describe the administrative law concept of law applica-
tion. Levin, supra note 19, at 6.
149. See, e.g., Report on H.R. 5288, supra note 20, at 36 (House Committee explains that
"mixed' questions will not be subject to review"). Even clearer proof arises from H.R. 5288's
preclusion language, which seems to describe clearly an administrative law type "application of law
[to] facts." Supra note 87. No one suggested that the compromise version had in any way altered
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mit the VA to argue that review in the statutory as-applied context is
prohibited along with review of law application. Occasional comments
by congressmen fortify this argument.'5 It is the position of this Note,
however, that such a reading is contrary to Congress' "true intent."''
While hereafter this Note will treat section 4092 as if it allowed full
review of law with no review of fact or law application, the misstatement
highlighted in this part of the Note will perforce be a point of contro-
versy in any number of VA benefit appeals.
C. The Constitutional Exception.
Although it is unclear just how great an effect judicial scrutiny of
purely legal issues, without review of fact findings, will have on appeals
from VA decisions,"' it is clear that section 4092's constitutional excep-
tion will bring about a rapid change.'5 3 Under the old section 211 (a), the
Supreme Court addressed constitutional challenges to VA decisions in
only one capacity, allowing a veteran to challenge the relevant underly-
ing statute's constitutionality.154 Lower courts were divided over the
more frequent questions of whether a court could review the constitu-
tionality of either VA regulations' 55 or individual claim dispositions.1 56
The exception in section 4092, which apparently passed without mention
through both houses,151 swiftly ends the debate among the circuits. For
whatever reason,15 8 Congress seems satisfied that all complaints of con-
the House version's scope of review in this area. See also supra notes 82-100 and accompanying text
(describing transition from H.R. 5288 to the Act).
150. See supra note 127 (statement of Rep. Montgomery, supporting an as-applied reading of
§ 4092).
151. See supra notes 87-98 and accompanying text.
152. See infra notes 169-216 and accompanying text, predicting the effect of the Act on appeals.
153. The Act prohibits judicial review of fact findings, but excepts from this proscription "the
extent [to which] an appeal under this chapter presents a constitutional issue." 38 U.S.C.A.
§ 4092(d)(2) (West Supp. 1989).
154. Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361 (1974).
155. See supra note 29.
156. See supra note 30.
157. Rep. Montgomery, in his summary of the scope of review, does not even mention the excep-
tion. 134 CONG. Rac. H10,343 (daily ed. Oct. 19, 1988).
158. It is possible that Congress allowed this exception merely as a concession, due to past case
law, that the courts were simply not going to refuse to review constitutional challenges.
Another explanation takes into account the origin of the exception, S. 2292. See House Hearings
on Judicial Review, supra note 59, at 140. Sen. Murkowski, that bill's sponsor, was in favor of
judicial review, generally restraining himself in order to allow compromise with the House. Supra
note 74. Following this analysis, the exception is more likely part of the deal Murkowski received
during the give and take in the compromise to get the Act passed.
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stitutional magnitude should be heard.
This abrupt resolution of the constitutional preclusion debate creates
some concern. There might be great potential for cloaking a blatant re-
quest for factual review in constitutional clothing. 159 Aside from those
instances in which the very lack of factual basis for a decision takes on
constitutional overtones,"6 factual challenges masquerading as constitu-
tional claims will force the court to balance the legitimacy of the claim
against the underlying purposes of the Act. Nevertheless, federal courts
have taken on the task of unmasking such tactics in other contexts.61
D. No Review of the Ratings Schedule
When a regional office of the VA receives a claim for disability benefits,
it must determine where the veteran's disability falls on the VA rating
schedule162 in order to award the appropriate amount of benefits. The
VA disperses benefits based on the level of impairment, with disabilities
ranging from zero to one hundred percent along ten percent incre-
ments.1 63 The ratings schedule classifies disabilities by type, and then
breaks each type down according to severity in order to assign it a grade
of impairment."6
The Act has specifically excluded the ratings schedule from judicial
review. 165 Notwithstanding the arguments in favor of this exclusion, 166
159. Several cases under § 211 (a) suggest this fear. See, eg., Ryan v. Cleland, 531 F.Supp. 724,
730 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) ("[w]hile plaintiffs' attempt to elevate their claims to a constitutional level is
certainly inventive, after careful consideration the court concludes that no bona fide constitutional
issue is presented.").
160. See infra notes 174-80 and accompanying text.
161. For example, the courts have to determine what claims do or do not reach constitutional
magnitude in any § 1983 action. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
162. This finding is only one of three the board will make. See infra notes 181-83 and accompa-
nying text.
163. 38 U.S.C. § 314 (1982).
164. 38 C.F.R. § 3.1 (1988). The following example illustrates the complexity of the schedule:
7305 Ulcer, duodenal:
Severe; pain only partially relieved by standard ulcer therapy, periodic vomiting, recurrent
hematemesis or melena, with manifestations of anemia and weight loss productive of defi-
nite impairment of health ... 60[percent]
Moderately severe; less than severe but with impairment of health manifested by anemia
and weight loss; or recurrent incapacitating episodes averaging 10 days or more in duration
at least four or more times a year ... 40
Moderate; recurring episodes of severe symptoms two or three times a year averaging 10
days in duration; or with continuous moderate manifestations... 20
Mild; with recurring symptoms once or twice yearly... 10
Id. § 4.114. There is also a table for combining two or more ratings. See id. § 4.25 (Table 1).
165. 38 U.S.C.A. § 4052(b) (West Supp. 1989) denies the CVA the power to review the schedule
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such blanket treatment leaves some concern. Might the exclusion pre-
vent the court from analyzing what are really legal issues?
t67
From an interpretive standpoint, this question is, of course, moot: it
no longer matters whether the issues so excluded are legal or factual be-
cause Congress has decided to shield the ratings schedule from review.
However, from a policy approach, one wonders whether those in Con-
gress understood the freedom this exception might give the VA.'1 8 The
bar on review of the ratings schedule presents a potentially imposing
limit on the amount of judicial review available to the veteran under the
Act.
IV. THE EFFECT OF 38 U.S.C. § 4092 ON JUDICIAL
REVIEW AND THE VA.
The most important questions about section 4092 concern its practical
application. Although the actual answers await the first cases to reach
the CAFC, 169 this Part will attempt to predict what effect the new law
will have. With many recurring fact patterns, the change in judicial re-
sponse from the old section 211(a) outcome will be clear and marked.
With others, there will be no change whatsoever. With some, the court's
response is anything but certain.
of ratings. 38 U.S.C.A. § 4092(a) (West Supp. 1989) bars the CAFC from hearing an appeal from
the CVA's refusal to review the schedule.
166. This commentator could find no statement as to why the exception was placed in the law.
See, eg., Report on H.R. 5288, supra note 20, at 5, 29. However, one might expect Congress to have
desired the agency to use its expertise in such complicated determinations.
167. Without the schedule, the rating board would face, with every new claim, a hearing on the
issue of how impaired a veteran is as a result of the fact findings on the type and severity of the
disability. The administrator has instead chosen to lay down guidelines based on average impair.
ments resulting from such symptoms. Through rulemaking, then, the VA has accomplished part of
the adjudication procedure. The Supreme Court allowed this type of adjudication through rulemak-
ing in the Social Security context in Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458 (1983).
Legal issues can arise from the schedule when, for example, the Administrator makes a factual
assumption which is actually beyond his or her authority; the decision not to allow any impairment
grading to issue for a specific disability might be one such ultra vires act. For illustration, see infra
notes 207-11 and accompanying text.
168. This Note develops further the effect such a broad exemption from review might have in
Part IV, infra notes 204-11 and accompanying text.
169. The CAFC will not properly acquire jurisdiction over a veteran's appeal until an appeal
goes before the CVA. 38 U.S.C. § 4092. The CVA will come into existence only upon presidential
appointment of its judges. Pub. L. No. 100-687, § 302, 102 Stat. 4105 (1988).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol67/iss3/14
1989] VETERANS' JUDICIAL REVIEW ACT
A. Constitutional Review
As noted earlier,17° section 4092(d)(2)'s constitutional exception to
factual preclusion will swiftly resolve some strong disagreements among
the lower courts. Besides challenging the constitutionality of underlying
statutes administered by the VA, 7 1 an appellant might now challenge
other, less obvious infirmities. The Act makes it clear that a veteran may
challenge the procedural steps in the claims department on due process
grounds. 172 Likewise, a veteran may now challenge individual VA deci-
sions under the equal protection clause.173
A more interesting development in constitutional questions might de-
rive from challenges to decisions based on a total absence of evidence.
Under the new law, the regional offices and BVA develop a record for use
on appeal at the CVA and CAFC. 74 The Supreme Court, in Superinten-
dent, Massachusetts Correctional Inst. v. Hill, 175 held that a decision of a
prison disciplinary board based on no evidence whatsoever would
amount to a denial of due process.176 In the usual agency review, such a
standard presents no real advantage for the reviewing court; it might as
easily have overturned the agency's decision on grounds that the action
was "arbitrary" or against "substantial evidence." '177 Yet in the context
of the VA, the Act precludes a court from looking at the facts. Notwith-
standing this preclusion, the language of section 4092(d)(2) clearly sug-
gests that a Hill-type due process claim would require the court to
170. Supra notes 154-58 and accompanying text.
171 The Supreme Court secured this right to review in Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361
(1974), see supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text, and veterans still enjoy it under the Act.
172. Prior to the Act, courts had been wary of such challenges, often treating them as mere
challenges to the decision reached, but cloaked in a constitutional mantle. See supra note 159 and
accompanying text. Compare specifically the majority and dissent in Marozsan v. United States, 852
F.2d 1469, 1485 (7th Cir. 1988) (the majority finds a distinction between formal regulations and
informal-yet-generally-applicable procedures ludicrous; the dissent asserts that to review the proce-
dures is to review the decision, not a regulation). The exception in 38 U.S.C.A. § 4092 (West Supp.
1989) settles this disagreement.
173. Courts have denied such challenges in the past. See, e.g., Hartmann v. United States, 615
F. Supp. 446 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
174 "Review in the [CVA] shall be on the record of proceedings ...." 38 U.S.C.A. § 4052(b)
(West Supp. 1989).
175. 472 U.S. 445 (1985).
176. "Ascertaining whether this standard is satisfied does not require examination of the entire
record, independent assessment of the credibility of witnesses, or weighing the evidence. Instead, the
relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion
reached by the disciplinary board." Id. at 455-56.
177. Normally, a court can review an agency's decision under § 706 of the APA. 5 U.S.C. § 706
(1982).
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investigate the facts, reviewing the agency's factual record in the process.
The exception therefore undermines Congress' protections against a
court's temptation to review the facts. 178
For the veteran, Hill's reasoning offers two benefits. Surprisingly, a
veteran may find occasion to use this rule in overturning baseless VA
decisions. 7 9 On a more practical level, the standard will force the re-
gional officer and BVA to make and record their decisions with greater
care. 
180
B. The Preclusion of Factual Review
The preclusion of factual review, when coupled with full review of
legal issues, raises additional concerns, especially in the context of disa-
bility benefits. Understanding these issues requires a minimal awareness
of the VA disability benefits claim process. At the entry level, a veteran
who seeks benefits goes before a local ratings board authorized to make
two predicate findings. The board must first find a veteran eligible to
receive benefits; only veterans who were discharged "under conditions
other than dishonorable" are eligible. 1 ' The second finding, one of enti-
tlement, revolves around the injury itself. This inquiry can be divided
into two subfindings: (1) whether the injury was "service related"' 82 and
(2) where the injury falls on the VA's rating schedule in type and sever-
ity. 83 The eligibility finding and both components of entitlement merit
inspection under the Act.
1. Eligibility
Findings of eligibility would seem to involve nothing more than a sim-
ple review of the veteran's military record; 84 nevertheless, questionable
178. This was the purpose behind the application of law language. 134 CONG. REC. H10,343
(daily ed., Oct. 19) (statement of Rep. Montgomery).
179. The Korean war veteran, denied benefits on the basis of a racial stereotype, see supra note
39, would benefit from this standard. So might the veterans who allege their benefits were decreased
due solely to VA budget cuts.
180. A VA cynic might argue the VA will simply bolster the record with any evidence it can find,
regardless of merit.
181. 38 U.S.C. § 101(2) (1982). See also, Note, A Critique of the Veterans Administration Claims
Process, 52 BROOKLYN L. REV. 533, 544 (1986).
182. 38 U.S.C. § 310 (1982). See also, Rabin, Preclusion of Judicial Review in the Processing of
Claims for Veterans' Benefits: A Preliminary Analysis, 27 STAN. L. REV. 905, 913 (1975).
183. See supra notes 163-64 and accompanying text.
184. This apparent simplicity deceived at least one commentator. See Note, supra note 180, at
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practices exist. There is a gray area between honorable185 and dishonora-
ble discharges, within which the VA has developed policies defining who
is and is not eligible for benefits.' 86 For example, the VA has adopted a
regulation that classifies a discharge for homosexual acts as dishonora-
ble." 7 Similarly, there is a regulation that denies benefits to one dis-
charged for "an offence involving moral turpitude."' 88 The question in
both cases is whether Congress intended to allow the VA to expand the
meaning of "dishonorable" to include the respective discharging offenses.
These examples pose an interesting test for the consequences of the
new law. Where the veteran challenges the regulation directly, the court
can review the regulation for both factual rationality and conformity to
law.' 89 However, if a veteran simply challenges the regulation in the
context of his own claim for benefits, the court can review the regulation
under section 4092 standards only.'9° Under the division this Note pro-
poses Congress to have enacted,' 9' the CAFC can review the decision
only as to a claim that it violates a standard which Congress intended to
impose. Applying the Act to eligibility, the court would need to find that
the phrase "under conditions other than dishonorable" adopts some view
of what is dishonorable, as opposed to leaving that determination up to
the VA.
19 2
544, which moves quickly past the eligibility stage to discuss the problems in the entitlement
procedure.
185. General discharges are treated as honorable discharges by the VA, entitling the veterans to
full benefits. TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON POLICIES TOWARD VETERANS, THOSE
WHO SERVED 31 (1974).
186. Of the 200,000 Vietnam-era veterans given less than a general discharge, most fell into the
gray area. Id. See also, P. STARR, THE DISCARDED ARMY 176-77 (1973).
187. 38 C.F.R. § 3.12(d)(5) (1988).
188. Id. § 3.12(d)(3).
189. The Act provides review under APA § 706, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1982) for such challenges. See
supra note 52.
190. See infra note 214. In regard to such rules, there would be no difference had the regional
office, on its own initiative, decided the same discharges were "dishonorable" for eligibility purposes.
Even absent a regulation, a veteran's eligibility status will be determined at the regional office. P.
STARR, supra note 186, at 177.
Where no regulation exists, but decisions consistently enforce a standard, such an approach is
known as rulemaking by adjudication. See infra notes 212-16 and accompanying text. This may
lead to a different treatment if the court is unable to determine the legal standard imposed. In such
event, the court may have the power to remand the decision for clarification before answering the
"question of law."
191. See supra notes 89-97 and accompanying text.
192. The most logical argument for such a reading is that Congress only intended "dishonora-
ble" to describe those discharges which the military itself has classified as dishonorable. This inter-
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2. Entitlement: "Service Related"
A similar controversy over review arises in the first arm of the entitle-
ment inquiry, which deals with whether the disability was "service re-
lated."193 In most situations, the veteran's burden of showing such
connection is either easy to meet'94 or actually presumed in the veteran's
favor.195 Where more controversial injuries arise, however, the VA can
make proving service relation a formidable task.'
96
Disabilities allegedly resulting from exposure to dioxin 97 in Vietnam
were just such a problem for the VA. The agency had denied almost all
dioxin-related disabilities on the grounds that plaintiffs could not prove
them to be service related.' 98 Congress took note of the VA's balking on
this and other controversial disability claims when it deliberated over
judicial review. 9 Congress also noted several denials of claims poten-
pretation would leave several VA regulations in violation of the law. See supra notes 187-88 and
accompanying text.
Another challenger might posit that, while Congress desired to give the VA some power to deter-
mine what was and was not "dishonorable," it also intended some boundaries to this discretion: a
court might find a particular application of the broad "moral turpitude" standard to go beyond this
congressional intent.
To understand the freedom a court has here, suppose a veteran was discharged for acts of "moral
turpitude" because he smoked marijuana. A court that finds this basis for denying benefits ludicrous
would reach the issue as a question of law, answering either that the VA has no authority to reclas-
sify a discharge as dishonorable or that the act itself involved no moral turpitude which Congress by
its statute would have intended to label "dishonorable." A court that thought such a veteran de-
served to be denied benefits for this transgression could simply avoid review by treating the issue on
appeal as an agency application of law and disclaiming any jurisdiction.
193.: 38 U.S.C. § 101(16); 38 U.S.C. ch. 11 (1982); more specifically, see 38 U.S.C. §§ 310, 331
(1982).
194. Generally, a veteran can prove "service connection" by comparing her pre-entrance medi-
cal examination with her severance examination. See Note, supra note 183, at 546.
195. See, e.g., 38 U.S.C. § 312 (1982).
196. One instance where the VA made proving service relatedness difficult involved the allega-
tion of disability as a result of freak Air Force experimentation. See infra note 200. The predictable
absence of any records from those experiments kept the veteran from receiving benefits. Id.
197. Dioxin is the toxic chemical found in Agent Orange and other defoliates.
198. Congress attempted to correct this situation through specific legislation. See Veterans' Di-
oxin and Radiation Exposure Compensation Standards Act, Pub. L. No. 98-542, 98 Stat. 2725
(1984) (codified at 38 U.S.C. § 354 (Supp. III 1985)). The effectiveness of that law, however, is open
to question. See, e.g., Nehmer v. United States Veterans' Admin., 118 F.R.D. 113 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
199. Senator Cranston actually felt he needed to address speculation that the Committee on
Veterans' Affairs was pursuing judicial review only as a response to difficulties in certain complex
areas, such as post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD; a psychological condition), radiation, or Agent
Orange cases. See 134 CONG. REC. S9182 (daily ed. July 11, 1988). He later brought up these issues
as ones wherein the VA's reaction has raised controversy. Id. at S9183.
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tially embarrassing to the VA.2 ° °
Unlike the eligibility finding, however, establishing a service connec-
tion is almost entirely a factual matter. The veteran must prove, to the
satisfaction of the VA under the circumstances, that the disability was
incurred or aggravated during the time provided by Congress.2" 1 The
veteran will likely find causation quite difficult to prove, especially where
the disability surfaces only years later. Yet a court will not review the
VA's findings on such questions because they are clearly findings of fact.
Thus, a major portion of the complaints that prompted the new legisla-
tion will still go without judicial review.
One should note that it is possible for a question of law to arise in this
decision. Two examples illustrate this point. Congress might have in-
tended in a given situation to add a presumption of service relatedness, or
at least to deny any irrebuttable presumption against such a finding.20 2
In either event, the VA's failure to comply is reviewable under section
4092. Similarly, Congress may not decide the service related question on
a given issue, but may prescribe what factors must be taken into account
in making the decision. Failure of the rating board or BVA to cite these
factors would also raise a question of law on review.2 °3
3. Entitlement: Placement on the Ratings Schedule
The second arm of the entitlement inquiry involves positioning the vet-
200. Two examples of claims that, if granted, could have embarrassed the VA surfaced in the
1986 hearings. See I Hearings on H.R. 585, supra note 1, at 133 (vivid detail of a macabre series of
experiments performed by the Air Force, yet the effects of which the VA decided were not "service
related"); 2 Hearings on H.R. 585, supra note 20, at 34 (veteran denied benefits despite evidence of
gross negligence occurring at VA hospital which substantially aggravated pre-existing condition).
201. See 38 U.S.C. § 310 (1982), supra note 181 and accompanying text.
202. A plausible argument to this effect exists in the dioxin law. See Veterans' Dioxin and Radi-
ation Exposure Compensation Standards Act, Pub. L. No. 98-542, 98 Stat. 2725 (1984) (codified at
38 U.S.C. § 354 (Supp. III 1985)). Section 5(b)(2)(A)(iii) of that law states that the VA "shall in-
clude. . . provisions specifying the factors to be considered in adjudicating... service connection"
with regard to those diseases found in § 5(b)(2)(B). Id. § 5(b)(2)(A)(iii). This later section arguably
mandates the inclusion of several diseases listed earlier and supplements that list with any others
which the VA might find sufficiently connected to dioxin. Id. § 5(b)(2)(B). Therefore, with respect
to the diseases listed earlier, Congress apparently never gave the VA the option of creating an ir-
rebuttable presumption against their service connection; instead, the VA can only specify the factors
to be considered.
This argument might be brought today under the Act, as 38 C.F.R. § 3.311a (1988) creates such
an irrebuttable presumption against all but one of the diseases outlined in the statute.
203. See Levin, supra note 94, at 235, 267-68 (Section (b)(2) of the ABA restatement of scope of
review doctrine, describing the issue of ignoring factors which Congress intended that courts address
as one of law).
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eran on the rating schedule. 2" One complaint that Congress heard ac-
cused the VA of allowing various rating boards to issue greatly disparate
ratings. A rating board in Arizona might grant far higher disability rat-
ings for a condition than one in Illinois.2" 5 Because placing veterans on
the rating schedule involves only fact finding and applying the law em-
bodied in the schedule, these decisions, too, will remain unreviewable. In
light of the importance of this placement-and inasmuch as the place-
ment determines the money a veteran will receive, it may be the most
important finding-Congress' decision not to authorize judicial oversight
is striking indeed.
C. Barring Review of the Ratings Schedule
Beyond entitlement and eligibility, the ratings schedule itself is also
not subject to judicial scrutiny due to a statutory exception that prevents
both ultra vires and constitutional challenges.20 6 There is no question as
to a court's reaction to this unqualified preclusion to a schedule chal-
lenge. After the Act takes effect, a court will deny any such appeal out-
right. The implication of this decision might be far reaching, however.
There are some decisions that would be beyond the scope of a court's
jurisdiction under the Act even without the specific preclusion of the rat-
ings schedule. An increasing number of Vietnam era veterans suffer from
a psychological disability known as Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder
(PTSD), yet they have elicited little response from the VA in the form of
benefits. Nevertheless, Congress has not addressed this problem directly,
and so the Administrator's decision to leave the controversial disorder
out of the ratings schedule is likely not a question of law. Without more
from Congress, a court would probably consider this as within the prov-
ince of the agency's discretion, a question of "application."
Other VA decisions will escape review solely due to the ratings sched-
ule exception. In the area of dioxin-related disabilities, Congress did en-
act, in the Veterans' Dioxin and Radiation Exposure Compensation
204. See supra notes 162-64 and accompanying text.
205. The Attorney General of Illinois raised this complaint during the 1986 hearings, claiming
that, while the Illinois regional office had the seventh largest veteran population, they handled only
three percent of all PTSD cases approved at 100 percent, while Wyoming, the smallest of 52 regional
veteran populations, approved twenty eight percent of those cases. 1 Hearings on H.R. 585, supra
note 1, at 35.
206. See supra note 165. The bar of judicial review of the ratings schedule occurs in § 4092(a),
well ahead of the constitutional exception of § 4092(d)(2).
[Vol. 67:889
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol67/iss3/14
VETERANS' JUDICIAL REVIEW ACT
Standards Act,2 7 a provision which a court might find requires certain
diseases to go on the ratings schedule.2 ° 8 Were the Administrator to
place only some of these diseases on the schedule, a question of law
would evolve. However, under section 4092 a court cannot review even
that choice, owing to the ratings schedule exemption described above.
The statutory exception might also shield from judicial review non-
military, moral choices which Congress may not have intended the Ad-
ministrator to make. For example, suppose that at some future date,
soldiers in active duty, for whatever reason, come in contact with the
HTLV virus, and many of them contract Acquired Immune Deficiency
Syndrome (AIDS). When the disease begins to surface some time later,
the soldiers, now veterans, press their claims for disability benefits. The
Administrator decides, for personal reasons based largely on stereotype,
that the contracting of AIDS must have resulted from some "immoral"
behavior, and therefore should go uncompensated. Instead of promul-
gating a rule on the subject, or even addressing the eligibility compo-
nent2°q-actions which might subject the VA to a costly and
embarrassing court struggle-the Administrator in this hypothetical
works through the ratings schedule. By withdrawing compensation for
certain predominantly AIDS-related ailments, such as pneumocystis
carinii pneumonia, 1 ° the Administrator could effectively keep the AIDS
veterans from receiving the benefits promised them. A court might find
no statutory authority for the Administrator to make this kind of purely
moralistic decision, and therefore conclude that the Administrator's deci-
sion raises a question of law. Executed through the ratings schedule,
however, the decision would escape judicial review.211
D. Deterring Rule Promulgation
One final effect of the Act deserving mention is its propensity to dis-
suade the Administrator from rulemaking. As mentioned above, the
courts will have the power to review direct challenges to rules and regu-
lations promulgated by the Administrator, under APA section 706 stan-
207. Pub. L. No. 98-542, 98 Stat. 2725 (1984) (codified at 38 U.S.C. § 354 (Supp. III 1985)).
208. See supra note 202.
209. See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
210. This form of pneumonia is one of the leading killers of AIDS victims, and is quite rare in
the rest of the population. New York Times, February 2, 1989, at Al, col. 3.
211. Of course, judicial review, relatively deferential even on questions of law, see supra note 89,
might not change the result in every case. Nevertheless, in many instances the new law provides
veterans the same treatment as other citizens with respect to access to the courts.
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dards for regulations.2" 2 The new jurisdiction will allow a court to step
in where it finds that the Administrator adopted bad policy; hence, the
prospect of judicial review might also convince the agency to rely more
heavily on case-by-case determinations. Of course, some issues will be so
clear and uncontroversial that a regulation makes sense for reasons of
efficiency.2 13 But where the Administrator is uncertain she is taking a
defensible position, at least with respect to her factual premise,21 4 the
chances for reversal on judicial review diminish appreciably in case-by-
case policy formation.2 1 By shielding factual elements of claims proce-
dures from judicial review, Congress may have inadvertently created a
disincentive for rule promulgation, contrary to general agreement that
promulgation is preferential to rulemaking by adjudication.21 6
V. CONCLUSION
The role of this Note has essentially been to report the intentions of
Congress in passing the Act and the consequences of the product of its
labor. Two interpretive points should be stressed, however, both of
which relate to the interpretation of the phrase "law... as applied to the
facts. ' 217 First, this Note posits that Congress was referring to the ad-
212. Supra note 52 and accompanying text.
213. A regulation is a more efficient way to implement a standard than adjudication. Promulgat-
ing a regulation requires time, especially if notice and comment procedures are followed, but this is a
one-time expenditure. Subsequently, adjudicators need only refer to the regulation, which has the
force of law.
Rulemaking by adjudication, on the other hand, requires the agency to make its case before the
adjudicator each time, and forces the adjudicator to allow the private party involved to produce
evidence against the adoption of the rule. This requirement makes rulemaking by adjudication far
more time consuming for the agency in the end. See generally SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194
(1947) (allowing an agency to proceed by adjudication, but criticizing it for the inefficiency and
unfairness of this process); NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759 (1969) (same).
214. Where the decision is made by the adjudicating body, and not by the Administrator in a
regulation, 38 U.S.C.A. § 4092 (West Supp. 1989) will apply and, therefore, preclude review of
findings of fact. See supra notes 41-107 and accompanying text.
215. Although rulemaking by adjudication still results in an interpretation of law, reversible by
the court, it seems more likely that a court would deny jurisdiction of an appeal from an adjudica-
tion, given the narrower scope of review.
216. Courts and commentators agree that rulemaking is better than a case-by-case approach;
rules more clearly articulate broad agency policy and allow more interested parties a simultaneous
chance to be heard on the issue involved. See K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 7.25
(2d ed. 1984); Bernstein, The NLRB's Adjudication-Rule Making Dilemma Under theAdministrative
Procedure Act, 79 YALE L.J. 571, 587-98 (1970). See also Chenery, 332 U.S. at 202 ("The function of
filling the interstices of the [Securities] Act should be performed, as much as is possible, through this
quasi-legislative promulgation of rules to be applied in the future").
217. 38 U.S.C.A. § 4092(d)(2) (West Supp. 1989).
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ministrative law concept of law application and not, as the language of 38
U.S.C. § 4092 might suggest, to as-applied challenges raised by the vet-
eran. 218 Second, a court should interpret this phrase as referring to the
instances in which Congress has left the choice of a standard up to the
VA.2 1' No other theory conforms as well to the choice of language or the
legislative history.
The question that emerges from this study is whether all members of
Congress realized the limited nature of review they now offer veterans.
When one backs away from the specifics and gains perspective on the
Act's consequences for judicial review, Congress actually put veterans in
only a marginally better position than they were in before the Act.
Under 38 U.S.C. § 4092, a court may review constitutional questions
concerning both the underlying statute and a VA regulation or adjudica-
tion. Yet under the old law, the courts had claimed a right to statutory
review since Johnson v. Robison,220 and review of constitutional issues
within regulations or adjudications had been gaining acceptance.22' Sec-
tion 4092 also allows review of questions of law, which can be equated to
ultra vires review. 222 Again, the Supreme Court had already granted re-
view in one type of ultra vires attack,2 23 and some lower courts had done
so in the other type.224 Finally the Act allows review of agency regula-
tions for factual rationality, 225 but even this improvement comes only on
direct attack,226 and not the more likely collateral attack within a benefits
claim.
Congress' message in the Veterans' Judicial Review Act should be
clear: the agency and Congress together will determine what is best for
218, See supra notes 121-51 and accompanying text.
219. See supra notes 89-97 and accompanying text.
220. 415 U.S. 361 (1974). See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
221. See supra notes 29-30.
222. As this Note defines questions of law, they arise only when the agency acts contrary to the
will of Congress or an agency regulation. This is precisely an ultra vires action. See supra note 25.
223. Traynor v. Turnage, 108 S. Ct. 1372 (1988) (allowing review of a challenge that an agency
regulation violated a non-VA statute).
224. See supra note 32 (cases which allowed review of an ultra vires challenge based on the VA's
own organic statutes).
Also, note that the House committee itself recognized this trend, and proffered the allowance of
review of questions of law in acquiescence to that movement. Report on H.R. 5288, supra note 20, at
22.
225. See supra note 52.
226. See supra note 214 and accompanying text.
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veterans,227 and the role of the courts will be limited to assuring compli-
ance with the law.
Jonathan Goldstein
227. Although the new CVA is given more authority than the CAFC to review agency policy,
this article I court is still part of the agency and the executive branch. It therefore does not figure
into the judicial review equation.
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